Traces the rise of Quebec nationalism to a combination of large-scale national & Quebecois social, economic, & political changes in the 1980s intensified by the mismanagement of social conflict by the Canadian government. It is shown that, by the mid-1980s, a powerful network of francophone-controlled state corporations, private institutions, & export businesses were in place to foment the nationalist wave that shook the province in the late 1980s via increasing economic globalization, in which Quebec participated more than other provinces. Further, the Conservative attack on the national government is taken to have increased public acceptance of fiscal decentralization & so made Quebec nationalist claims appear more legitimate. It is concluded that, although the 1995 referendum failed, it provided ample evidence of the power of the nationalist claims & has given the movement toward Quebec independence an aura of inevitability. 2 Tables. D. M. Smith
Regional autonomy and separatist movements severely test the conflict management capacities of a nation's political system. Following Calhoun, a series of institutional arrangements and political practices which depart from majority rule decision making have been identified in the literature as contributing to the peaceful management of subcultural cleavages. Such arrangements provide minority subcultures with institutionalized means of self-protection and guarantees against stable unrepresentation and official cultural stigmatization. But, as Schattsneider pointed out, conflicts are best regulated before they start and institutional arrangements such as those above must be made before regional cleavages become too politicized. At a certain stage of conflict, peaceable partition may be the only solution. In Canada and the antebellum U.S., failure to set up "formal modes of sectional self protection" led to conflict regulation failure and the emergence of separatist movements in Quebec and the South. Without mechanisms of the type noted above and in the context of mass s politics, the machinery of national political parties and intersubcultural elite accommodation which had held regional cleavages in check simply proved inadequate.
Regional autonomy & separatist movements severely test the conflict management capacities of a nation's political system. Following J. C. Calhoun (A Disquisition on Government, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co, 1953), a series of institutional arrangements & political practices which depart from majority rule decision-making have been identified in the literature as contributing to the peaceful management of subcultural cleavages. Such arrangements provide minority subcultures with institutionalized means of self-protection & guarantees against stable unrepresentation & official cultural stigmatization. But, as E. E. Schattsneider (The Semi-Sovereign People, Hinsdale, Ill: The Dryden Press, 1974) pointed out, conflicts are best regulated before they start & institutional arrangements such as those above must be made before regional cleavages become too politicized. At a certain stage of conflict, peaceable partition may be the only solution. In Canada & the antebellum US, failure to set up "formal modes of sectional self-protection" led to conflict regulation failure & the emergence of separatist movements in Quebec & the South. Without mechanisms of the type noted above & in the context of mass politics, the machinery of national political parties & intersubcultural elite accommodation which has held regional cleavages in check simply proved inadequate. Modified HA.